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Busch v. Service Plastics, Inc.,
261 Fed. Supp. 136 (6th Cir. 1966) and
Temco, Inc. v. General Screw Products, Inc.,
261 Fed. Supp. 793 (6th Cir. 1966)
In Busch and Temco, the jurisdiction of the court had been
invoked by the plaintiff under a "long-arm" statute of the state.
Although neither case involved a foreign country or a national of
a foreign country, the issue of jurisdiction in such an instance is
the same as though the relative process in each instance had been
used to bring before the court a foreign defendant not presently
within the jurisdiction for personal service. In Busch, the defendant
was doing business in Illinois, manufacturing plastic containers
which were sold widely in other states. In Ohio the plaintiff pur-
chased a gallon of milk in a container made by the defendant.
While carrying this container to her home, the plastic handle in
some way twisted off causing the large container to fall and shatter
on the sidewalk, resulting in severe injury to the defendant's foot
and ankle. The gravamen of the complaint was the alleged defective
container and the damage was for the physical injury. The court
reviewed a number of decisions relating to the "long-arm" statutes,
including five decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Con-
cerning these the court said:
We also think it is fair to say that these five Supreme Court cases
established only general and not precise guidelines. Perhaps they
purposely do no more than this. We observe, however, that,
at one time or another in the opinions, three primary factors,
namely the quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of
the contacts, and the source and connection of the cause of action
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with those contacts, are stressed, and that two others, interest of
the forum state and convenience, receive mention .
(Page 142.)
On this basis and recognizing that a large business was done by
this plastic company in Ohio, the court found that there were suf-
ficient grounds for jurisdiction of the Ohio court.
Temco combined both questions of jurisdiction and questions
of conflicts of law. The action was an alleged breach of contract
between a corporation organized under the laws of Tennessee with
its principal place of business in Tennessee, and a corporation
organized under the laws of Wisconsin with its principal place of
business in Wisconsin. The defendant was alleged to be a sub-
contractor of the plaintiff which had a contract with the Army to
deliver a quantity of artillery shells. Alleging a breach of the agree-
ment, the Tennessee corporation (plaintiff) began suit in the Ten-
nessee courts and sought to subject the Wisconsin corporation to
the jurisdiction of Tennessee by service under the "long-arm" statute
of that state. Negotiations for the contract had taken place mostly
in Tennessee but the written contract was signed in Wisconsin.
The plaintiff contended there was an oral contract consummated
in Tennessee and merely affirmed in Wisconsin. The defendant
maintained there was no contract until it signed the confirmation
portion of plaintiff's purchase order on December 13, 1965, in
Wisconsin. The court considered the "long-arm" statutes of Illinois
and other states and compared them with that of Tennessee and
discussed the negotiations for the contract, finding that the agent
of the defendant was "deliberately availing himself of the benefit
of Tennessee laws." The court found that the Wisconsin corpora-
tion was subject to the jurisdiction of Tennessee. Some of the
discussion might seem to raise the question as to whether the law
of Tennessee or Wisconsin should be applied but as to that there
is no affirmative decision. Perhaps in this case, the commercial
law of the two states was sufficiently identical that no issue on this
point could be raised. However, that is not the case under certain
other decisions relating to the conflicts of law.
Noel and France as Executors of the Estate of Marshall L.
Noel, deceased, and others, v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana
In this case an airplane of Venezuelan registry and owned by
a Venezuelan corporation whose stock was government owned was
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one of several defendants. The airplane in question had exploded
over the Atlantic Ocean opposite the New Jersey coast shortly
after it had left Idlewild (JFK) Airport for its trip to South America.
The suit was for damages due to loss of life in the accident. The
executors of the deceased had sued various and sundry corporations
including the maker of the airplane, the manufacturer and assembler
of its engines, and that of its propellors, and the organization which
had serviced the plane prior to its departure, and had also in-
cluded the airplane company. With the exception of the airplane
company, all of the parties were United States domestic corporations
and against them judgments were obtained and paid and they were
discharged. The plaintiffs continued their action against the Vene-
zuelan company on a cause of action available under the laws of
Venezuela in such an accident but not available under any United
States law. This was for pain and suffering of the deceased prior
to his death, which in the peculiarities in this accident could only
have been very brief as mentioned in the case. The airplane com-
pany defended on the ground that the judgments rendered in the
case covered all the damages and had been paid. The court, how-
ever, held that the airline must still answer to the allegations of the
cause of action claimed under Venezuelan law.
Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,
253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), reported 1 Int. Lawyer
In this case, the lower court had held that the foreign airline
did not have a valid defense in the terms of the Warsaw Conven-
tion limiting its liability because it had failed to give adequate
notice to the passenger of its limitation of liability. This case has
now been confirmed on appeal (370 F.2d 508 [2d Cir. 1966]),
but the affirmance was by a divided court. Judge Moore vigorously
dissented. He said:
The majority in their opinion indulge in judicial treaty-making.
The language of the treaty [referred to as the Warsaw Conven-
tion] is clear. Its provisions are not difficult to comprehend. Its
mandates are simply stated. Ascertainment of compliance should
therefore present no real problem. (Page 515.)
Later on he said:
The majority do not approve of the terms of the treaty and,
therefore, by judicial fiat they rewrite it. (Page 515.)
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He further stated:
Substantial revisions upward have been made [in the treaty pro-
visions] but they have been made, as they should be, by treaty
and not by the courts. (Page 515.)
McClure, Administratrix v. United States Lines
Company, 368 F.2d 197 (4thCir. [1966])
The conflicts of law questions also arise in the case of McClure,
Administratrix v. United States Lines Company, supra. The op-
erative facts of this case occurred wholly in France and the principal
question decided by the United States Court of Appeals was whether
French law or United States law should be the controlling law to
be applied. There were really two issues in this case. One was the
question of fact or rather the determination whether negligence or
lack of care was present and the other was as aforesaid what law
should apply. The facts were: In a certain harbor in France, two
United States ships were tied up at a mole, one toward the sea
at a considerable distance from the other. The facts show that a
seaman from the ship (S.S. Keystone State) farthest toward the
sea, returning from shore leave alighted from an automobile in
the inner harbor more than a mile from where his ship lay. As
he was passing the ship nearest to the land, the crew of that ship
observed that he was too drunk to continue farther. The crew of
this United States ship of which he was not a member seated him
on a chair, gave him some coffee, and tried to keep supervision
over him. When he appeared to be capable of proceeding, a mem-
ber of the crew of this ship said he would accompany the man to
his own ship and asked him to wait while the crewman got his
coat from his own quarters. When the crewman returned, however,
the drunken sailor had attempted to go forward and a hundred feet
or so away had fallen into the bay. He was pulled out immediately
but could not be revived. The suit was against the ship whose crew
had attempted to assist him. Article 63 of the French Penal Code
imposes criminal sanctions upon one
'[W]ho voluntarily abstains from giving assistance to a person
which he could, without risk either to himself or to third persons,
give either by his personal action or by securing assistance.'
(Page 198.)
This is referred to as the "Good Samaritan statute." * The United
* Note: For discussion of foreign "Good Samaritan" statutes, see article on
that subject, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 14, No. 4, page 630.
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States law under the Jones Act was found by the court to be as
follows:
In American jurisdictions, in cases arising under the Jones
Act, it is settled that it is not within the scope of his employment
for a seaman to aid an intoxicated member of the same crew in
returning to their ship. (Page 199.)
The court found that the case had been erroneously decided by a
lower court under French law whereas United States law should
have been applied and stated: "All of the really significant rela-
tionships are with this country, not with France." (Page 201.)
The Court of Appeals recognized that France has an obvious interest
in the enforcement of Article 63 of the French Penal Code. How-
ever, the Court did not believe that this interest would extend to
the concern of the vicarious liability of an American ship to the
American widow of an American sailor whose life was lost under
the peculiar conditions mentioned although in a French harbor.
The Court of Appeals sent the matter back to the lower court for
further consideration, stating as its reasons for so doing:
We are loath to enter final judgment for the ship, however,
for the tacit assumption that the case was governed by French
law may have had a significant effect upon the making of the
record. Justice seems to require a remand to give the parties an
opportunity to produce any additional evidence that may be
available which has a material bearing upon the issues as defined
within the framework of American law. Our conclusion that,
on the present record, American law is the appropriate choice
may have a decided effect upon the relevance of evidence thought
immaterial under French law. (Page 202.)
The judgment against the American ship was thereupon vacated and
the case remanded for further proceedings.
Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co. etal., 385 U.S. 182, 385 Sup. Ct. 182 (1966)
The question in this case was the jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to determine the reasonableness of a
joint through rate covering transportation from the United States to
a place in Canada. The American railroad involved with its con-
necting carriers had delivered a large number of loaded freight
cars from a point in the United States to a point in Canada. The
shipper paid a joint through international rate which it later claimed
was unreasonable and began proceedings to secure back a part of
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the funds paid under this rate. The Commission found the rate
unreasonable and ordered the railroad to pay the difference be-
tween the rate charged and what the Commission found to be a
reasonable rate. The railroad refused to pay part of the amount
on the theory that the award represented an alleged overcharge
for the Canadian part of the trip. It claimed that the Commission
had no jurisdiction over the rate to be charged in Canada. The
shipper then began an action in the District Court to collect the
unpaid amount. The District Court found for the petitioner; the
Court of Appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated that of
the District Court, holding that when a carrier performing transpor-
tation within the United States enters into a joint through inter-
national rate covering transportation both in the United States and
abroad the Commission has jurisdiction to determine the reasonable-
ness of the joint through rate and it may order the carrier performing
domestic service to pay reparations in the amount which the Com-
mission finds the rate to be unreasonable.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, pointing out that the act of
Congress gives the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over
transportation from or to any place in the United States or to or
from a foreign country " 'but only insofar as such transportation
... takes place within the United States.'" (Page 184.) Mr.
Justice Douglas then states:
How that can be read, 'Whether or not such transportation . . .
takes place within the United States' remains a mystery. (Page
184.)
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